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The agricultural sector in Fiji is seen in 
many quarters—including by the Reserve 
Bank of Fiji—as potentially a key driver of 
needed increases in export earnings and 
import substitution to reverse the continuing 
increase in the trade deficit. Despite the 
many pleas for better performance from the 
farming sector, it has performed poorly for 
a long period. Because Fiji is well endowed 
with agricultural land and rural workers, 
its agriculture sector should be a key part 
of the Fijian economy in terms of providing 
subsistence in rural areas and helping ensure 
food security for the society as a whole, as 
well as contributing to export earnings and 
foreign exchange.
Why is the agricultural sector not per-
forming better? Why is the sector finding it 
difficult to increase exports and to produce 
commodities that will substitute for the 
large volume of imported agricultural 
products consumed domestically, including 
by tourists?
Externally, the quarantine restrictions of 
countries that are potential export markets 
for Fiji’s agricultural output are a constraint 
on exports. Considerable effort—scientific 
and diplomatic—is needed to break down 
these barriers. So far, Fiji has overcome these 
barriers to only a very limited extent. As well 
as sugar, which is not discussed here, dalo, 
kava, ginger and cassava have been the main 
crops exported; although horticultural prod-
ucts (particularly pawpaw and vegetables, 
including chillies) are the fastest growing 
component of agricultural exports. While 
dalo production and exports appear to be 
increasing, production and exports of kava 
and ginger have declined. In the case of kava, 
the decline is due to bans on imports of kava 
by the major industrial-country markets. In 
the case of ginger, production is declining 
because the main producers are leaving the 
industry and attempts to have other farmers 
take on ginger production have not been very 
successful. Pawpaw production and exports 
have responded well to the relaxation of 
quarantine restrictions.
On the domestic front, the absence of 
secure individualised tenure to land and the 
resulting difficulty of accessing credit without 
such secure collateral are well-known 
obstacles to the expansion of agriculture. 
Political instability and law and order 
problems, particularly on-farm theft, also 
pose significant constraints to investment in 
agriculture. The running down of agricultural 
research and extension over many years has 
also had adverse impacts on the introduction 
of new and improved crop and livestock 
products and farming systems.
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The theft of crop and animal products 
has become a pervasive problem for 
commercial farming, leading to a loss of 
interest in investment in farming. There 
is a noticeable shift to cassava and dalo 
and away from higher-valued crops such 
as vegetables and ginger—even on large 
farms. This is very likely in part a result of 
the high incidence of theft, as cassava and 
taro are more difficult to steal—though they 
are still subject to theft. Because farm labour 
is becoming more difficult to hire and more 
costly, the shift in farming activity is also 
likely to reflect a move away from labour-
intensive activities such as the growing of 
ginger and vegetables and towards the less 
labour-intensive activities; timeliness of 
operations is less important in the case of 
dalo and cassava.
Another problem leading to the lack 
of development of a vigorous commercial 
farming sector in Fiji is the lack of interest 
in building up and passing on farm assets 
to the next generation. Commercial farming 
has been undertaken primarily by the 
Chinese and Indian communities. The most 
likely cause of the lack of interest in building 
up and passing on farm assets is insecurity 
over tenure to the farm, as the Chinese and 
Indian farmers have mainly held leasehold 
title to native land. Therefore, the families 
have invested in their children’s education. 
With the limited opportunities for skilled 
workers in Fiji, this has meant that the 
children leave Fiji and the parents follow.
While acknowledging these many 
constraints, we wish to concentrate in this 
article on the absence of good agricultural 
policies over many years and the adverse 
impacts that poor policies and badly de-
signed projects have had on the agricultural 
sector, including on research and extension 
in the Department of Agriculture (and its 
various manifestations). The poor policies 
and projects that have been implemented 
by various governments appear to have 
their roots in a poor understanding of the 
economic, cultural and social environment 
in which they are to be implemented.
The economic and cultural 
environment of agriculture
Leaving aside the sugar-growing sector, the 
agricultural sector in Fiji can be categorised 
broadly as comprising a commercial sector 
and what we call the ‘village’ sector. We 
define the commercial sector as comprising 
large corporate farming enterprises that 
employ professional managers and those 
owner–operator farming enterprises 
whose major activity is not production for 
subsistence. There are only a handful of 
corporate farming enterprises, primarily 
in the poultry industry. Larger-scale, 
commercial farmers have been operating 
in dairying, beef cattle and pig-raising and 
the growing of ginger, fresh vegetables and 
dalo.
Most Fijian villagers have semi-subsist-
ence livelihoods, producing a surplus for 
sale to meet education and health expenses 
as well as purchases of food and other 
expenses such as social and cultural obliga-
tions and entertainment. There has been a 
large focus by successive governments and 
by the Agriculture Department on improv-
ing agricultural productivity in this sector 
and on increasing its commercialisation. 
These endeavours have, however, had very 
limited success.
One of the main difficulties experienced 
by private middlemen or traders or proces-
sors in dealings with the village sector—as 
well as by government bodies set up to 
carry out similar functions (such as Fiji 
AgroMarketing and Food Processors [Fiji] 
Limited)—is in ensuring the continuity and 
the quality of supplies from village farmers. 
This difficulty appears to stem largely from 
the farmers’ lack of respect for the contracts 
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that they make with the traders. Firms that 
contract ‘out-growers’ experience similar 
difficulties. Contracts are agreed with farm-
ers for the delivery of a specified volume of 
production—perhaps after supplying them 
with inputs. However, the contractors often 
find that the farmers sell the produce to 
someone else offering a higher price. This 
lack of respect for contracts makes it very 
difficult for middlemen or processors to 
carry on a viable business. The fact that the 
village farmers usually have no commercial 
assets that they stand to lose as the result of 
not honouring a contract means that there 
is little possibility of sanction through the 
courts.
Another difficulty facing the viability of 
indigenous farming businesses, especially 
businesses established within the village, 
is the prevalence of social and cultural 
obligations (kerekere). Attempts to overcome 
this difficulty through the formation of joint-
management groups within the village do 
not appear to have been successful, as they 
have proven prone to governance problems. 
There is still belief in some quarters in 
the viability of village cooperatives, but 
experience is such as to not inspire much 
confidence in this form of enterprise. 
Experience of management groups among 
Maori tribes in New Zealand has seen 
greater success, where the need to ensure 
good governance and efficient management 
structures seems to have been realised. Until 
this point is reached in Fiji, joint ventures 
between villagers and non-indigenous 
entrepreneurs might offer a better means 
of ‘quarantining’ village businesses from 
onerous cultural and social obligations. 
Even this model, however, might not suit 
agricultural enterprises because outputs 
are hard to monitor, which could lead to 
disputes.
The absence of formal, individualised 
title to native land in the form of long-term 
leasehold is not necessarily a constraint on 
the commercialisation of agriculture within 
the village sector—although it could lead to 
less than the optimal level of development. 
Traditional authority structures within 
the village are able to provide individuals 
with sufficient security to the use of land 
to encourage investment and individual 
effort, allowing farming to take place on a 
commercial scale. This is, however, seldom 
done. Still, the absence of formal title to 
the land, such as a long-term lease backed 
by the government, means that the land 
cannot be used as collateral for loans from 
commercial banks. Therefore, the amount of 
credit available to the Fiji farming sector is 
much less than the optimal level.
Because of the village sector ’s dif-
ficulty of access to credit, governments 
have attempted to overcome this problem 
by extending loans, primarily through the 
Fiji Development Bank—a government 
instrumentality. There has, however, been a 
high failure rate with this lending activity—
in terms of the lack of success of the projects 
and poor repayment of the loans extended 
because of an apparent ‘cultural unwilling-
ness to repay debts’. A major factor leading 
to the poor performance with respect to the 
projects themselves and the loan repayment 
is that because borrowers have not provided 
security for the loan, they have little to lose 
by not trying to ensure the success of the 
project or not repaying the loan. It would 
be a different matter if governments did 
not continue to provide ‘hand-outs’ in the 
form of security-free loans. With govern-
ments continuing to behave in this way, 
villagers do not have to worry about loss 
of ‘reputation’—something that they would 
otherwise have to be concerned about if they 
were interested in securing further loans.
It should not be expected that within the 
village sector there will be the same response 
to seemingly profitable opportunities as in 
the much more market-oriented part of 
the economy. What has been described 
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as ‘subsistence affluence’ appears to be 
pervasive. That is, the communities can live 
comfortably by devoting only a few hours a 
week to food production and do not see it as 
necessary to respond to income-generating 
opportunities, except to pay for essential 
services such as education and health. 
What underlies this behaviour is not well 
understood; but it certainly should not 
be ignored and should not be expected to 
change quickly or in response to agricultural 
policies and schemes that work well under 
completely different circumstances.
Moreover, ‘subsistence affluence’ needs 
to be protected, as it has to be the foundation 
for an even higher standard of living in rural 
areas. The evidence, however, points to life 
becoming more difficult for some rural com-
munities as food resources become scarcer 
with declining soil fertility, soil erosion and 
the encroachment of pests and diseases. It 
is very important, therefore, for a focus on 
protecting and enhancing the subsistence 
basis of the economy through measures 
such as the protection of the environment, 
the replanting of food trees and improving 
village farming systems.
As described in detail below, with 
respect to successive governments’ policies 
for the agricultural sector, the expectation 
of continued government hand-outs in the 
farming sector has been encouraged by 
policies that lead to farmer dependency 
on government. As with all forms of 
economic dependency on government, 
individualism and enterprise are sapped 
and the dependency is very difficult to 
reverse.
A form of dependency that has been 
encouraged by government policies is 
that farmers expect the government to 
provide ‘assured’ or guaranteed markets. 
Governments around the world have 
attempted to provide guaranteed markets 
and prices for agricultural activities—for 
example, through price stabilisation schemes 
or marketing boards. These have, however, 
proven ineffective and costly and have now 
mostly disappeared. In most countries, the 
private sector is now responsible for the 
marketing and distribution functions for 
agricultural products.
A short history of agricultural 
policy in Fiji
External commercial interest in the natural 
resources of the Fiji Islands began with trade 
in sandalwood and bêche-de-mer. By the 
1860s, Fiji was attracting European settlers 
intent on establishing cotton plantations to 
capitalise on the boom in cotton prices due 
to the American civil war. The renowned 
botanist Bathold Seeman, from London’s 
Kew Gardens, surveyed the wide Rewa 
River flats for their potential in supplying 
cotton to the looms of Manchester. One of 
the first books about the Fiji Islands was 
entitled Fijian Cotton Culture, and Planters’ 
Guide to the Islands (1870) by W.C. Pechey.
The cotton industry was short-lived, 
however, as it could not compete with 
the producers in the American south 
once the civil war ended. Attempts by the 
Department of Agriculture in the mid 1930s 
to establish an export cotton industry were 
met with scepticism by the private sector 
because of problems in getting labour to 
cultivate, pick and sort the cotton—even 
though a hybrid cotton variety had been 
specially bred for Fijian conditions at the 
cotton experiment station in Sigatoka.
Fiji became a British colony in 1874. 
Under the colonial administration, Fijians 
were taxed in produce, not cash—indicative 
of a capable agricultural base. The pressure 
for the colony to pay its own way led to 
the establishment of a large-scale sugar 
industry with investment from the Colonial 
Sugar Refining Company. Indian labourers 
were brought to Fiji from 1879 under the 
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indenture system and were encouraged 
to become permanent settlers after their 
five-year contracts had expired.
Apart from sugar, the other mainstay of 
Fiji’s economy was copra. Islanders in Lau 
were trading coconut oil in the mid nine-
teenth century, while large-scale plantings 
began in the 1870s in Caukaudrove Province, 
including in Taveuni. In the beginning, these 
planters on freehold land received high 
prices for their product and had access 
to cheap labour—initially, workers from 
other Pacific islands and India, who were 
later replaced by Fijian workers. During the 
1940s, there was a shift of emphasis in the 
production of copra towards Fijian village 
producers.
Chinese farmers grew bananas along 
the banks of the Sigatoka River in the early 
1900s. Some of these Chinese growers 
were established produce merchants from 
Melbourne and Sydney, and Fijian bananas 
were exported to Australia until tariffs were 
increased in 1911. Fijian village producers 
undertook banana production in a big 
way and, by the 1950s, were producing 
Box 1  Fijian banana production: ‘village’ fruit versus ‘plantation’ fruit
By 1961, Fiji’s exports of bananas totalled more than 200,000 cases, with the bulk coming from 
village growers and sold through 38 licensed shippers (37 Fijian organisations, including 
cooperatives, and one Indian businessman). 
In 1964–65, the government, through the Land Development Authority, established a farming 
settlement in Lomaivuna to grow bananas under the management of the Fiji Development 
Company. The scheme began with the settlement of 100 farmers, each provided with a house, 
five acres of cleared bush and four acres planted with bananas. Later, another 400 acres of 
bananas were established on a cooperative basis in Waidina.
The Department of Agriculture encouraged the development of plantation-type agriculture 
with banana trees planted in ‘evenly spaced rows’ in order to improve quality. To reinforce 
the drive for quality, the Banana Marketing Board set different prices for ‘village’ fruit and 
‘plantation’ fruit. Plantation-grade fruit was paid an extra 10 per cent and qualified if the 
bananas came from ‘organised plantations where high standards, of planting, cultivation, 
fertilizing and spraying were carried out regularly and were so certified by the Director of 
Agriculture’.
The reality was, however, that very few growers applied fertiliser or followed accepted 
disease-control measures. By 1970, there was only one farm that qualified for plantation 
status and the bonus payment for its fruit. The Department of Agriculture then began a 
pilot Intensive Banana Scheme, with selected growers, to produce bananas on an intensively 
managed basis, using clean planting material from the department’s research station and 
supervised by two extension officers specialising in banana production under the guidance 
of a banana research officer.
Of the 52 acres in the Intensive Banana Scheme, by 1972, only 12 acres were well maintained 
after Cyclone Bebe. By 1973, it was recognised that the future of bananas as an export crop 
was bleak and the department gave up its extension and research efforts.
Today, nearly all of Fiji’s banana output—estimated to be about 4,700 tonnes in 2002 and 
worth F$5 million—is for domestic consumption and comes from village growers.
Source: Department of Agriculture, various years. Annual Report, Department of Agriculture, Ministry of 
Agriculture, Fisheries and Forests, Suva.
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more than 200,000 cases for export to New 
Zealand. There were unsuccessful attempts 
by the colonial administration and the Fijian 
government to ‘commercialise’ banana 
production (Box 1).
For the first two decades after independ-
ence, the government’s agricultural policies 
gave priority to replacing food imports 
(import substitution) and promoting new 
export products. The import substitution 
focus was mainly on broad-acre crops 
such as rice and feed grains and livestock 
products (beef, poultry and dairy products). 
Hopes for new export crops were placed on 
commodities such as coffee, cocoa, ginger, 
cashew nuts and pawpaw.
The government, however, was more 
than a promoter of these import substitution 
and export activities. Besides identifying the 
activities, it was also an active participant, 
assisting farmers through infrastructure 
and farm inputs, as well as becoming 
engaged in processing and in marketing the 
produce—locally and overseas (McGregor 
and Gonemaituba 2002).
In 1989, there was a policy shift by the 
government towards greater reliance on 
the private sector and export markets and 
away from the protection of industries 
from imports. Some import controls were 
removed and some tariffs reduced. The 
private sector—farmers, processors, traders 
and exporters—was to determine what 
commodities were produced and what 
markets were developed. McGregor and 
Gonemaituba (2002) reported that the 
private sector responded positively to 
the challenge. The government encour-
aged horticultural exports and exports of 
traditional crops (dalo, duruka and kava) 
as well as ginger to replace the declining 
sugar exports.
In an about face,  however,  the 
Commodity Development Framework 
(CDF) was introduced in the 1998 budget 
‘to jump-start the agricultural sector’. This 
program was supposedly based on a 1996 
Asian Development Bank (ADB) report on 
Fiji’s agricultural sector. Four years later, 
after government expenditure totalling 
in the tens of million of dollars, the CDF 
scheme was dropped (Box 2). In its place, the 
government introduced the Farm Assistance 
Scheme, an affirmative-action policy, largely 
for indigenous Fijian villages, providing 
free farm inputs and the reintroduction of 
government marketing in the form of Fiji 
AgroMarketing Limited, established under 
the Agricultural Marketing Act of 2004.
Presently, direct forms of assistance are 
being provided to farmers through schemes 
such as the Beef Cattle Programme and the 
Dairy Industry Support Programme. The 
Beef Cattle Programme subsidises pasture 
improvement through handing out seeds 
and other planting materials; it also assists 
with stockyard construction and fencing, 
as well as subsidies for cattle breeding 
through the provision of bulls and artificial 
insemination. The Dairy Industry Support 
Programme gives assistance in the form of 
bull servicing, artificial insemination, grass 
and legume seeds for pasture improvement, 
veterinary services and construction of 
milking and calf sheds. There are also capital 
projects to support the expansion of sheep 
and goat meat production.
The provision of direct subsidies to try 
to encourage farming goes back a long way. 
Before independence in 1970, subsidies were 
paid for coconut planting and rehabilitation, 
for cocoa planting, for the importation of 
livestock for breeding and for the purchase 
of fertilisers, weedicides, pesticides and 
barbed wire. There has, however, also long 
been doubt about the effectiveness of such 
subsidies. In the Agriculture Department’s 
1969 Annual Report, it was questioned 
whether the subsidies were having the 
intended effect of improving farming prac-
tices. The report noted the department’s 
disappointment about the lack of interest 
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in maintaining coconut plantings once the 
subsidies had been paid.
Governments have also tried, without 
success, various farming schemes to de-
velop particular products for domestic and 
export markets. For example, there have 
been schemes to promote beef cattle, rice, 
cocoa, pineapple and banana farming. A 
review of the history of various agricultural 
schemes (Box 3) yields many lessons for 
policymakers.
Besides dalo and cassava, rice consump-
tion is the main source of calories in Fiji. 
Most rice demand is met through imports 
but there have been persistent calls for 
domestic rice production to replace imports. 
Despite millions of dollars spent by govern-
ments on developing infrastructure for 
irrigated rice and promoting rice-farming 
schemes—as well as a period of tariff 
protection—rice production has not done 
well. All government-initiated, irrigated rice 
schemes have failed because these activities 
are economically inefficient in Fiji.1 Indeed, 
rain-fed rice growing for personal consump-
tion has performed much better than the 
irrigated farming schemes. With the recent 
high global prices for rice, there have been 
increased dryland rice plantings and the 
Agriculture Department has provided some 
support to this supply response through 
assistance to rice growers in the form of 
machinery and farm inputs. The outcome 
has been a sharp increase in rice output.
The spread of the African tulip tree to 
the point where it has become a major weed 
infestation threatening the livelihoods of the 
village sector and commercial farming enter-
prises illustrates the failure of governments 
to recognise or develop the will to address a 
major problem, while continuing to put funds 
into various unsustainable schemes. The 
African tulip tree is affecting substantial areas 
of most of the country (Box 4). The tree has no 
predator in the Fijian environment to prevent 
its spread, which is posing a severe threat 
to much of the arable land and particularly 
that farmed in the Fijian villages. The threat 
Box 2  The Commodity Development Framework, 1997–2000
It was said that the Commodity Development Framework (CDF) was based on a strategy of 
export-based, private sector-led growth, with government playing only a facilitating role. 
Essentially, however, the scheme involved the government ‘picking winners’ by selecting 
particular commodities that were identified as having market potential and trying to make them 
‘winners’ by providing grants for various activities along the supply chain. Much was made of 
the idea of forming public–private partnerships to promote agricultural development. It was 
a strategy intended ‘to remove all bottlenecks, once and for all’, so that farmers and fishermen 
could maximise their production and ‘obtain the best return from their investments’.
The funding initially requested for the CDF from the national budget was $97 million. The 
framework was promoted as being able to increase national output by $1.71 billion over four 
years. The funding request was later reduced to $69 million. It was reduced even further, as the 
government had to redirect funds to urgent issues. By 2000, the scheme was quietly forgotten. 
The government had to write off its investments in some of the public–private partnerships 
established, such as its F$500,000 equity in Wonder Gardens.
The most important issue that the planners forgot was the indiscipline that comes with using 
‘other people’s money’.
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Box 3  The pattern of failure of agricultural schemes in Fiji
A review of the Agriculture Department’s annual reports shows that the various agricultural 
schemes that governments have supported in Fiji follow a depressingly similar pattern. First, 
there is great enthusiasm for assistance to be given to the industry. The enthusiasm has usually 
arisen from a spike in the world price for a commodity that is being imported or for which 
domestic consumption is increasing, and therefore there is a push for import substitution—for 
example for rice. Otherwise, the pressure comes from the identification of an overseas market 
by a local or external consultancy team or a desire to copy successful agricultural developments 
overseas—for example, cocoa. Sometimes traditional crops that have done well as semi-
subsistence crops or new crops with a limited number of small growers have been earmarked 
for commercialisation. Schemes have never been triggered by the results of research identifying 
a better quality or higher-yielding variety or an improved farming system. 
A number of untested assumptions are made and public funding is justified on the basis of 
good cost–benefit ratios. The initiation of the scheme might receive considerable support from 
a donor—for example, support for cocoa from the European Union. Farmers are attracted to 
the scheme through the government making land available and providing infrastructure such 
as roads and irrigation—for example, for bananas and rice. Other subsidies are provided in 
the form of assistance with land preparation and harvesting, planting material and fertilisers. 
In the case of the banana scheme, land was provided to farmers and half the land was planted 
for them.
In the initial years of the schemes, rapid increases in output are achieved. Aside from the 
assistance provided, the increased output is due to the fact that the land provided is often 
virgin land free of pests and diseases. Within a few years, however, extension officers give 
warnings about land degradation, rising costs and plant-protection problems. Output begins 
to decline as the subsidies are withdrawn, or problems develop with the infrastructure 
(the irrigation channels or the drains are too small), the soil fertility declines and pests and 
diseases begin to affect production. The government is unable to assist with research into soil 
fertility, weed control and control of pathogens. As well, the better farmers who have been 
able to make a good income from their participation in the scheme leave. In order to reverse 
the declining output, the government might intervene by expanding grower area and getting 
more subsistence farmers into commercialisation.
The declining productivity might cause the farmers to seek alternative crops or revert 
to semi-subsistence. Bank loans become difficult to obtain as bad loans increase, and 
exporters and processors begin to shy away from extending credit because farmers are 
not honouring contracts.
The commodity might undergo a later rehabilitation phase, perhaps due to another spike 
in world prices or fresh enthusiasm by a new minister or head of department with little 
institutional memory of what has happened before. Again, government and donor assistance 
is provided in the form of various kinds of subsidies and by ‘guaranteeing’ markets, rather 
than undertaking research to reduce the biological risks. Rehabilitation is, however, usually 
difficult as pests and diseases are by now firmly established and the more progressive farmers 
have exited the industry or are no longer young and willing to work hard.
Finally, the government gives up and closes the project. As a sign of resignation, the commodity 
might be no longer mentioned in the department’s annual reports.
Source: Department of Agriculture, various years. Annual Report, Department of Agriculture, Ministry of 
Agriculture, Fisheries and Forests, Suva.
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in the villages is heightened by the fact that 
the African tulip spreads by airborne seeds 
(over a wide area), roots and cuttings and 
quickly establishes under the type of minimal 
cultivation carried out in village gardens. It 
is apparent in some villages that gardens are 
being forced further and further away from 
the village, making food production more 
onerous. Unfortunately, the wood of the 
African tulip is extremely difficult to burn and 
moreover has no commercial value. Once the 
trees are established, clearing costs run into 
thousands of dollars a hectare. The spread of 
the weed is also obviously a severe threat to 
Fiji’s biodiversity.
The Agriculture Department was warned 
about the spread of this weed about 20 years 
ago but little research has been done to find 
predators that will at least keep it under 
control and it has spread quickly in recent 
years. Without early control, substantially 
more areas of arable land will be recoverable 
only at great cost. As the African tulip is also 
growing in other Pacific countries, considera-
tion should be given to researching its control 
on a multi-country basis.
Governments have attempted to provide 
some form of government marketing function 
in Fiji for more than 30 years: in the 1960s, the 
department was purchasing wet cocoa beans 
for its fermentation plant at Naduruloulou 
Research Station; in 1971, the National 
Marketing Authority was established and was 
later corporatised as the National Trading 
Corporation (NATCO); and most recently, 
it took the shape of Fiji AgroMarketing 
Limited (established in 2004)—always with 
much the same costly outcome. The most 
Box 4  The spread of the African tulip tree in Fiji
The African tulip tree (Spathodea campanulata) was introduced widely throughout the tropics as 
an ornamental tree. In the Pacific islands, it has invaded agricultural land, forest plantations and 
natural forests. It was introduced in Fiji in the 1930s and has been recognised as a problem for 
about 20 years. It has, however, spread very quickly in the past 10 years. Secondary or regrowth 
forests previously cleared for agriculture make up more than 20 per cent of the total forest 
cover. The African tulip is the predominant tree in these secondary forests. Under the shifting 
cultivation system practised in Fiji, it has quickly invaded fallow areas. Farmers estimate that 
the time taken to clear one infested hectare manually is about 15 months. Because of difficulties 
controlling African tulip infestations, farmers tend to leave these areas and clear natural forest. 
This is resulting in the weed’s incursion further and further into natural forests.
Some preliminary research has been undertaken by the department over the years in the form 
of herbicide treatments and investigation of biological control. This research has not, however, 
been sustained. It is likely that an integrated weed management program will be needed for 
control, which could involve a combination of biological control, chemical control, crop rotation 
and depletion of the buried seed banks. Identification of the best form of management will 
require sustained research of various forms.
Of significant concern, however, is whether the farming community will undertake the 
necessary management system, especially in the villages where such intensive management 
of weeds is uncommon. Therefore, the threats to the sustainability of village subsistence and 
to biodiversity are significant.
Source: Most of this information was drawn from Department of Agriculture, 2001. Integrated Control of African 
Tulip Tree (Spathodea campanulata), 23 January 2001, Research Division, Department of Agriculture, Ministry of 
Agriculture, Fisheries and Forests, Suva.
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bizarre attempt at government agricultural 
trading was the Fiji Military Forces Auxiliary 
Unit, established after the 1987 coup, which 
involved military personnel in Agriculture 
Department vehicles touring the country-
side as purchasing agents, offering prices 
above those offered by the private traders. 
Because of their inexperience as traders, 
however, and the resulting difficulties in 
establishing domestic and overseas markets, 
the result was a failure.
The continuation of this kind of 
government intervention in markets has 
stemmed from a widespread belief among 
farmers and politicians that private sector 
traders are somehow cheating the farmers in 
the prices offered at the farm gate. While it is 
true that the prices paid for the unprocessed 
products are usually a small percentage of 
the eventual retail price, allowance has to 
be made for the costs borne at the various 
stages of the marketing chain (collection, 
transport, storage, added value, risks of loss, 
and so on). It is generally true that when 
there is competition among middlemen in 
the marketing chain, they do not receive 
monopoly profits. Therefore, it should be 
the government’s main responsibility to 
ensure that there is effective competition 
among traders and processors, rather than 
competing against them using subsidised 
inputs and effectively ‘crowding out’ 
the private sector. It is not valid for the 
government to claim that the private traders 
are too few and/or are under-resourced 
when it is restricting their ability to function 
effectively by competing against them.2
Another of the assumptions behind 
the implementation of these government 
marketing bodies was that they would 
‘establish’ markets where none were 
available and then hand them over to the 
private sector. This premise implies that 
there is some form of ‘market failure’ or 
‘market externality’ that is preventing 
private traders from operating. No case 
has been made for such market failures, 
however, and it is doubtful that there would 
be one.
Instead of operating to ‘establish’ new 
markets, the state marketing agencies 
competed directly with private traders by 
purchasing products from farmers who 
were already supplying the private traders, 
by offering a higher price than the private 
traders. The government traders then sold to 
the same importers overseas at lower prices 
than the private traders. The result was 
‘crowding out’ of the private traders, losses 
incurred by the government marketing 
authority and lower export earnings than 
would otherwise have been the case. Fiji 
AgroMarketing Limited is continuing to 
operate in this way, presenting considerable 
difficulties for the many private traders 
exporting produce such as dalo.
In order for a healthy, competitive agri-
cultural sector to develop, farmers must be 
educated to understand that the best way to 
ensure markets and earn the highest prices 
is to honour contracts with traders and 
processors and ensure continuity of supply 
at the best quality. Traders and processors 
cannot establish and maintain markets if 
they cannot honour their contracts with 
the wholesalers and retailers. Maintaining 
a market is a two-way street between the 
farmers and the traders/processors.
Overcoming the ‘hand-out’ mind-set
The Tutu Rural Training Centre (TRTC) 
trains young village men to establish farming 
enterprises and young village women to 
set up small-scale home enterprises (Box 5). 
A key to the success of this training program, 
which seeks to instil economic responsibility 
in these young people, is the understanding 
reached by the village communities involved 
that they must provide the young people 
with security (particularly to land) for 
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their activities, so that they will be willing 
to invest their effort and savings in their 
enterprises. 
The Agriculture Department has been 
assisting with funding of the TRTC since 
1973, but with budgetary cutbacks in 
recent years, the level of support has 
fallen. Given that the centre is one of 
the very few activities being undertaken 
to change the hand-out mentality and 
overcome the cultural obstacles to the 
establishment of indigenous farming 
businesses, the reduction in government 
funding is unfortunate. It is understood, 
however, that the Agriculture Department 
realises the high value of the work that the 
TRTC is doing and has decided to promote 
it as a centre of excellence and to replicate 
its activities in other areas. One such area 
is Prison Services, where it is planned to 
educate prisoners in the principles of the 
young farmers’ and young women’s courses 
so that, when released, prisoners can return 
to their villages and become productive 
members of the community.
Other non-governmental organisations 
that have recognised that village com-
munities have become overly dependent 
Box 5  Tutu Rural Training Centre, Taveuni
The Tutu Rural Training Centre (TRTC) was established in Taveuni in 1969 by the Society of 
Mary, the trustee and owner of the land on which it is based. The aim of the centre is to train 
young men and women to develop individual enterprises within their home villages. The 
focus of the training has been Cakaudrove Province; however, it is being expanded to Bua 
and Macuata Provinces.
Young men enrol in young farmers’ courses for periods up to four years. Young women enrol 
in six-month courses. To be enrolled in the course, the young men must demonstrate their 
serious intent by planting 1,000 yagona plants in their village. As well, the village and the 
students’ parents must agree to set aside an area on which the young men can establish their 
farming enterprise. During their course, the young men move back and forth between their 
farming enterprise in the village and their allocated block in TRTC. In this way, TRTC can see 
what obstacles the young men might be facing in attempting to implement what they have 
learnt at TRTC. Income earned from the allocated TRTC blocks is expected to finance their 
participation in the course and provide an income for the young farmers from which they will 
build savings for the construction of a home and investment in their village farming enterprise. 
The average annual income earned by the graduates from the young farmers’ course is said 
to be F$15–25,000.
At the completion of their six-month course (which is held every second year), the young 
women are expected to have earned sufficient income to purchase a sewing machine or cooking 
utensils to be used in their home-based business. Up to 50 young men and 30 young women 
are enrolled in the courses. As well as the young farmers’ and young women’s courses, TRTC 
also runs married couples’ courses, parents’ courses, village courses and leadership courses.
It is claimed that the attrition rates from the courses are very low, with 0–15 per cent attrition 
of young men during the four-year course. About 98 per cent of graduates from the young 
farmers’ course are said to return to their village and earn significant livelihoods through 
farming. They are also expected to act as role models and continue mentoring other young 
men in their village.
Source: With acknowledgment to Dr Andrew McGregor and the Tutu Rural Training Centre for this information.
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on external assistance and are working 
towards changing this mind-set are Partners 
in Community Development Fiji (PCDF) 
and the Ecumenical Centre for Research, 
Education and Advocacy (ECREA). These 
organisations are doing this work through 
facilitating discussions within villages 
to help the communities find their own 
solutions to their needs. Poor village leader-
ship, including disputes over titles, and 
insecurity of access to land within the village 
for individuals to establish enterprises are 
said to be the two main problems identified. 
Communities are being encouraged to turn 
to government only for the provision of 
infrastructure (particularly transport and 
communication) and agricultural research 
and extension.
The need for better policy analysis
One conclusion that is clear from the various 
government schemes in the agricultural 
sector over the years is that once the 
government assistance is withdrawn, farmer 
interest soon wanes. What are the reasons for 
this and the lessons to be learned? It could 
be that without the subsidy, the activity is no 
longer the best income-earning opportunity 
for farmers, so they turn to other activities. 
Or it could be that the kind of work involved 
is not attractive—for example, when the 
harvesters provided in the rice schemes 
were in need of repair, the farmers did 
not wish to harvest the rice by hand. Or 
it could be that once the project discipline 
and management advice are withdrawn, 
the farmers are unable to operate the 
enterprise effectively. The lessons from these 
experiences should provide a caution for 
the future implementation of agricultural 
policies.
Other conclusions can be drawn from 
the review of the various agricultural poli-
cies and schemes adopted by governments 
over the years: first, most are based on a very 
poor appreciation of what can be expected 
from the farming community that they are 
intended to serve. Much better economic 
analysis of the schemes is needed. Second, 
the primary motivation for the schemes is 
usually not an outcome of research such as 
higher-yielding or better quality varieties or 
improved farming systems. Rather, the driv-
ing force has mainly been a sharp increase 
in world prices or the identification of a 
prospective market. These might be helpful 
factors in developing an industry; however, 
it has to be remembered that sharply higher 
prices are usually temporary and that other 
countries will be responding to the higher 
prices and prospective markets. Third, 
Agriculture Department research has 
found it difficult for one reason or another 
to support the schemes through combating 
the pests and diseases that have developed 
as production has intensified.
As well, it has to be stressed that the 
law and order situation in Fiji is now tak-
ing a heavy toll on the agricultural sector. 
Theft of agricultural produce—crops and 
livestock—from the field is reducing the 
incentive to invest in farming in many 
localities and, indeed, is changing the 
structure of agricultural production towards 
producing commodities that are less easy to 
steal. It appears that animal production has 
been falling significantly due to theft. Crop 
production has been changing from higher-
valued fruit and vegetable commodities to 
lower-valued and harder-to-steal commodi-
ties such as cassava and dalo—though even 
these are not immune to theft.
The communities of Chinese farmers 
in Fiji, who have accounted for most of the 
larger commercial enterprises, have suffered 
seriously from loss of life and property 
through criminal activity. In part for this 
reason, the number of Chinese farmers 
has declined significantly in recent years 
and those that remain are not farming as 
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intensively as before. Rather than living 
on the farm to protect their crops, they 
are living in town because of the threat 
to personal security. It is reported that, in 
some areas, 30 per cent or more reduction 
in output has to be allowed for theft when 
doing farm budgets. Thus, the Agriculture 
Department and the government have to 
take the impact of poor law and order into 
account in evaluating the prospects for 
particular agricultural policies and schemes 
and the agricultural sector’s capacity to 
contribute to the economy.
Realistic expectations are critical
The village sector—which has been the 
focus of many policies and schemes—does 
not respond in the same way to policies and 
schemes that work well in other cultural 
environments. Whether this behaviour is 
due to ‘subsistence affluence’ and whatever 
underlies that kind of behaviour, or whether 
it is due to the lack of security for individuals 
to develop farming enterprises within the 
village, these are facts of life that have meant 
that the best-intentioned policies have not 
worked. There are also the troublesome 
issues of the lack of respect for contracts with 
traders and processors and the widespread 
theft of farm output that bedevil attempts 
to encourage farm enterprises.
The government policies and projects 
adopted over the years have promoted a 
dependency culture among the farming 
community. Therefore, there is a need for 
much more realistic expectations about 
farmer responses to agricultural policies, es-
pecially from within the village sector. There 
is also, however, a need for the government 
to reverse the mind-set that has developed in 
the farming community to expect hand-outs 
from the government whenever a problem 
arises. The government’s primary role 
should be to provide an effective physical 
and regulatory infrastructure within which 
the farming sector can develop—that is, 
to provide transport infrastructure that 
enables farmers and traders to bring goods 
to market and farmers to purchase inputs; 
power and water services; regulations that 
ensure effective competition among traders 
and processors and for the provision of 
communications; research, extension and 
market information that allows the farming 
sector to increase productivity and incomes; 
and law and order.
Research directions
While there is an important place for private 
agricultural research in the development 
of private sector activities, certain forms of 
public agricultural research are essential. 
A reasonable argument can be made that 
plant and animal introduction, plant and 
animal breeding, plant and animal nutrition, 
agricultural engineering and farming 
systems research could be undertaken by 
the private sector, as these forms of adaptive 
research are in their interest. Public research 
on measures to ensure plant and animal 
protection against pests and diseases is, 
however, critical for the protection of Fiji’s 
plant and animal resources. Soil conservation 
and other research on environmental issues 
are also forms of ‘public good’ research. 
Basic research that leads to findings that 
should be available to all without restriction 
is also a form of research that should 
be undertaken by the government—
otherwise it will not be undertaken or will 
be undertaken at a socially suboptimal level. 
In Fijian agriculture, however, where the 
industry structure is in the form of many 
small farm enterprises, there is also a case 
for the government to undertake adaptive 
research on behalf of farmers.
Research in the Agriculture Department 
was allowed to fall into a very run-down 
181
Policy dialogue
Pacific Economic BullEtin
Pacific Economic Bulletin Volume 24 number 2 July 2009 © the australian national university
state, with very few experienced research-
ers employed and very limited funds 
available for research. The few researchers 
available have been largely servicing the 
provision of hand-outs for farmers such as 
multiplying seeds and seedlings. Buildings 
and equipment on research stations are in 
poor repair. There was no increase in the 
operating budget for research for the past 
eight years; moreover, funds that were al-
located for capital projects were transferred 
to other projects or schemes within the 
department. Most of the vehicles held by 
the Research Division were purchased by 
donor funds many years ago and are now 
old, in poor condition and are very costly 
to keep in running order. The poor state of 
agricultural research in the department is of 
great concern to the present management.
A perusal of the department’s annual 
reports shows that in the 1960s, 1970s and 
1980s there was a considerable amount of 
good-quality agricultural research being 
undertaken by the staff of the department. 
Evidence of the volume and quality of the 
research also shows up in issues of the Fiji 
Agricultural Journal, which was published 
by the department. Publication of the 
journal became irregular, however, and 
eventually ceased in the 1990s—in parallel 
with the decline in agricultural research.
The running down of research appears 
to have several causes. First, as a result of 
the 1987 coups, most of the senior agricul-
tural scientists left the country. Therefore, 
the amount and quality of the research 
undertaken have suffered, as well as the 
mentoring of younger researchers. Second, 
there is the decline in the capital funding 
of the Research Division,3 which has had 
obvious implications for the state of repair 
of the buildings and equipment on research 
stations, as well as for funds to undertake 
research trials (fuel, seeds, research assist-
ance, and so on). The deteriorating research 
resources have clearly had an adverse 
impact on researchers’ willingness to con-
tinue in their positions. Third, within the 
department, funds have been directed away 
from basic research and extension functions 
towards the funding of hand-outs to farm-
ers. Fourth, the salaries of highly trained 
researchers have not been competitive with 
opportunities available overseas.
Throughout the 1980s and early 1990s, 
the then Ministry of Primary Industries (MPI) 
had an association with the International 
Service for National Agricultural Research 
(ISNAR) in the Netherlands, with ISNAR 
giving the MPI assistance in research 
planning. After a review of the ministry’s 
research division in 1982, ISNAR, jointly 
with a task force from MPI, prepared an 
agricultural research plan for Fiji (ISNAR 
and MPI 1985). This was followed in 1991 
by a review of progress in agricultural 
research in the ministry (ISNAR 1991).
The 1991 review noted the very damag-
ing impact of the 1987 coups on agricultural 
research, because of the emigration of most 
of the experienced research staff. Other 
problems noted included the fact that the 
share of operating costs in the research 
budget had increased only from 12 per 
cent in 1984 to 17 per cent in 1989—well 
short of the 30 per cent recommended by 
the 1985 report. With such a small alloca-
tion for operating costs, it was difficult to 
carry out a research program. These and 
other problems identified are reflected in 
the recommendations made in the 1991 
review
rebuild the professional capacity of •	
the research staff (primarily through 
external postgraduate training and 
overseas experience)
adopt a rigorous procedure for setting •	
research priorities; because of the 
small research resource base, it is 
important to concentrate on only the 
most important areas; involve the 
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economic and planning section in the 
setting of research priorities to build 
in the expected economic impacts of 
the research
consider a substantial reduction in •	
the number of active research stations 
(keeping possibly only Koronivia and 
three others) and consolidate research 
on the reduced number of stations with 
a focus on the main research priorities; 
use the remaining research stations for 
other activities for the time being
undertake joint on-farm trials to enhance •	
the relationship between research and 
extension
establish and maintain strong external •	
linkages to make full use of external 
knowledge and materials
do not employ researchers in non-•	
research functions such as seed 
multiplication and laboratory services 
for health and forensic analysis (which 
appear to be taking up research 
staff time equivalent to three to four 
researchers)
to enhance the systems perspective •	
of  the  research program,  form 
interdisciplinary teams focusing on 
production systems—for example, 
crop and livestock and inter-cropping 
farming systems—rather than the 
commodity-based approach.
Unfortunately, for the most part, the 
problems identified in the 1991 ISNAR 
review remain relevant today, as do the 
recommendations.
The focus of extension services
The focus of extension in the Agriculture 
Department has been on what could be 
described as the semi-subsistence, or village, 
sector of the agricultural economy, which is 
appropriate. The larger, commercial farms 
can access reasonably easily, and should 
be able to pay for, the technical advice 
needed from private sector agricultural 
specialists—although extension officers 
should be in a position to offer them advice 
about the latest departmental research 
results and relevant overseas research 
findings.
It is not reasonable to expect that the 
village sector—which comprises mainly 
very small to small individual or commu-
nal enterprises—pays for commercial farm 
advisers, and therefore it should be a major 
focus of the extension service. The depart-
ment’s (and indeed the government’s) 
approach to this sector should, however, 
be radically changed. As we have noted, 
the approach to this sector through the 
agricultural policies and the many different 
projects and schemes adopted over the 
years has, in the main, had a detrimental 
impact on the sector. The policies and 
schemes have created a dependency culture 
that will be very difficult to change—but 
which must be changed if the contribution 
of agriculture to the Fijian people’s living 
standards is to increase.
Rather than grandiose schemes to 
promote the commercialisation of the 
village farmer, based on the distribution 
of all kinds of farm inputs and subsidised 
credit, the agricultural extension of-
ficer’s role in working with village farmers 
should be similar to that of the Tutu Rural 
Training Centre, and the few others we 
have mentioned, in helping to develop 
economic responsibility in young farmers 
and an appreciation of agriculture and the 
way in which it can improve their family’s 
welfare.
The opening of the mobile phone 
market in Fiji and the prospect of more 
widely available services and much 
lower phone charges are highly positive 
for farmers and for extension officers. The 
wider the mobile phone coverage, the 
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greater will be the benefits. Farmers have 
mobile phone access to traders on market 
information as well as being able to call 
the Agriculture Department’s help desk 
for advice on farming practices. Improved 
telecommunications in the form of the 
availability of fast internet speeds will 
also allow extension officers and farmers 
to access web sites around the world for 
relevant information.
Conclusions
The agricultural policies and schemes 
adopted by successive governments have 
failed because they have been based on a 
very poor understanding of the economic, 
social and cultural characteristics of the 
people involved in farming—particularly 
those in the traditional village sector. They 
have also failed because they have involved 
the government unnecessarily intervening 
in the agricultural sector in ways that have 
damaged the sector rather than assisting it. 
In the process, the policies and schemes have 
had highly detrimental impacts on research 
and extension in the department and have 
created and reinforced a dependency mind-
set in the farming community.
Policies have been adopted without be-
ing subjected to detailed economic analysis 
and without a good understanding of what 
can be expected from the farming sector. In 
agriculture, the consequences of poor policy 
are difficult to reverse and indeed can affect 
more than one generation. Agricultural 
production cannot be easily switched on and 
off. The Agriculture Department must have 
the capacity to provide good economic 
analysis of proposals coming forward from 
whatever source, which hopefully will lead 
to the rejection of inappropriate policies 
and schemes.
Notes
1  There are frequent calls for government 
support for rice growing in Papua New 
Guinea, where domestic consumption is also 
met largely by imports. It is likely that rice 
growing in Fiji would also rank very poorly 
in terms of the returns to hours worked.
2 See Koko Siga (Fiji) Limited (2008) for an 
extensive discussion of the history of this 
form of government intervention in Fiji 
and the false assumptions that underlie it. 
With regard to the assumption that there 
is monopoly behaviour among traders 
because of their limited numbers, this article 
notes that there are almost 300 licensed 
produce exporters, of which ‘around 50 are 
consistently active’ (p. 11).
3 Capital grants for the Research Division for 
1996–2008 are as follows (’000 dollars) in 
Table Note 3 below:
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